titoli, abstracts, parole chiave >>>
Mental causation: a defence

Bacchini, Fabio (2011) Mental causation: a defence. L&PS - Logic and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9 (1), p. 477-483. eISSN 1826-1043. Article.

[img]
Preview
Full text disponibile come PDF Richiede visualizzatore di PDF come GSview, Xpdf o Adobe Acrobat Reader
254Kb

Alternative URLs:

Abstract

If we accept causal exclusion, property dualism and physical determinism, mental epiphenomenalism follows. Accord-ing to Yablo (1992), we can save mental causation by rejecting causal exclusion and considering the mental/physical relation as an instance of the determinable/determinate relation. In this paper I ex-amine Crane’s argument (2008) against the causal relevance of de-terminables, and I argue that we still have good reasons to think that determinables may be causally efficacious. As mental properties can be also considered as exhaustive disjunctions of physical realizers, the causal relevance of mental properties is also questioned by the widely shared opinion that disjunctive properties can not be causally efficacious. I consider Clapp’s arguments (2001) in favor of the causal relevance of disjunctive properties, and I conclude that dis-junctive properties may survive both Armstrong’s famous objections (1978).

Item Type:Article
ID Code:9197
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Mental causation, overdetermination
Subjects:Area 11 - Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche e psicologiche > M-FIL/02 Logica e filosofia della scienza
Divisions:001 Università di Sassari > 01-a Nuovi Dipartimenti dal 2012 > Architettura, Design e Urbanistica
Publisher:Università degli studi di Trieste
eISSN:1826-1043
Copyright Holders:© Fabio Bacchini 2011
Deposited On:12 Sep 2013 11:12

I documenti depositati in UnissResearch sono protetti dalle leggi che regolano il diritto d'autore

Repository Staff Only: item control page