Delegation, externalities and organizational design

Gautier, Axel and Paolini, Dimitri (2009) Delegation, externalities and organizational design. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29 (4), p. 2683-2692. eISSN 1545-2921. Article.

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Abstract

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

Item Type:	Article
ID Code:	8069
Status:	Published
Refereed:	Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Delegation, hierarchy, asymmetric information
Subjects:	Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
Divisions:	001 Università di Sassari > 01 Dipartimenti > Economia, impresa, regolamentazione
Publisher:	Economics Bulletin
eISSN:	1545-2921
Deposited On:	18 Oct 2012 12:19

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