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Search and the firm's choice of the optimal labor contract

Paolini, Dimitri (2007) Search and the firm's choice of the optimal labor contract. Cagliari, CRENoS. p. 26 (Working Papers CRENoS, 2007, 08). Working Paper.

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Abstract

This article studies the behavior of a firm searching to fill a vacancy. The main assumption is that the firm can offer two different kinds of contracts to the workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one. The short-term contract acts as a probationary stage in which the firm can learn the worker's type. After this stage, the firm can propose a long- term contract to the worker or it can decide to look for another worker. We show that, if the short-term wage is fixed endogenously, for the firms can be optimal to start a working relationship with a short-term contract, but that this policy has a negative impact on unemployment and welfare. On the contrary, if this wage is fixed exogenously, this policy could be optimal also from welfare point of view.

Item Type:Working Paper
ID Code:45
Status:Published
Uncontrolled Keywords:Search, temporary employment, short-term wage
Subjects:Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
Divisions:002 Altri enti e centri di ricerca del Nord Sardegna > CRENoS-Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud, Università di Cagliari e Università di Sassari
001 Università di Sassari > 01 Dipartimenti > Economia, impresa, regolamentazione
Publisher:CRENoS
Publisher Policy:Depositato per gentile concessione del CRENoS
Deposited On:18 Aug 2009 10:01

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