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Delegation and information revelation

Gautier, Axel and Paolini, Dimitri (2007) Delegation and information revelation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 163 (4), p. 574-597. ISSN 0932-4569. Article.

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DOI: 10.1628/093245607783243007

Abstract

This paper analyzes, in a setup where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter, and only the agent knows its realization. If the principal delegates the control over the first decision to the agent, his choice may indicate the information that he possesses. If the principal retains control over the second decision, discovering this information is valuable. Hence, this paper provides a new rationale for delegation: A transfer of control to the informed party can be used to discover private information.

Item Type:Article
ID Code:2953
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Incomplete contracts, organizations, authority
Subjects:Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
Divisions:002 Altri enti e centri di ricerca del Nord Sardegna > CRENoS-Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud, Università di Cagliari e Università di Sassari
001 Università di Sassari > 01 Dipartimenti > Economia, impresa, regolamentazione
Publisher:Mohr Siebeck
ISSN:0932-4569
Deposited On:10 Sep 2009 10:19

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