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Social preferences and private provision of public goods: a ‘double critical mass’ model

Antoci, Angelo and Sacco, Pier Luigi and Zarri, Luca (2008) Social preferences and private provision of public goods: a ‘double critical mass’ model. Public Choice, Vol. 135 (3-4), p. 257-276. eISSN 1573-7101. Article.

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9258-6

Abstract

We set up an evolutionary game-theoretic model aimed at addressing the issue of local public good provision via direct commitment of voluntary forces (private donors and nonprofit providers) only. Two classes of agents are assumed to strategically interact within a ‘double critical mass’ model and we investigate the critical factors affecting the dynamic outcomes of such interaction. Further, we explore the conditions under which (what we term) ‘evolutionary crowding-out/in’ occurs, depending on agents’ degree of opportunism, social comparison and positive selective incentives (such as subsidies given by the government to ‘virtuous’ citizens or nonprofits only).

Item Type:Article
ID Code:2792
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Double critical mass, evolutionary crowding-out, privately provided public goods, prosocial emotions, social preferences
Subjects:Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-S/06 Metodi matematici dell'economia e delle scienze attuariali e finanziarie
Divisions:001 Università di Sassari > 01 Dipartimenti > Economia, impresa, regolamentazione
Publisher:Springer Netherlands
eISSN:1573-7101
Copyright Holders:© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2007
Deposited On:21 Aug 2009 09:46

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