Giordo, Andrea (2008) Osservazioni giuseconomiche e analisi comparativa intorno al regolamento (CE) n. 261/04. Doctoral Thesis.
In air transportation three carriers’ conducts have always created significant hassles to passengers: denied boarding, flight cancellation, and delays. The European Union has regulated these matters by means of Reg. 261/04/CE. The US legislator has chosen to regulate only the first of the above-mentioned conducts, i.e. denied boarding (due to either overbooking or overselling), while leaving carriers in charge of privately controlling the remainders. Both European and American legal systems are characterised by the will to regulate denied boarding consequences (caused or not by overbooking). Both of them do not expressly prohibit it, though. The reason of this choice lies in the need to set a limit on economic negative effects of no-show. However, it becomes necessary to prevent carriers’ opportunistic behaviours. An efficient contractual dynamic might be attained both by adoption of remedies against asymmetric information and by promoting cooperation among contractors (also by increasing liability costs). Under this approach, the EEC regulation (granting the possibility to claim compensation for additional damages, forbidding carriers’ liability limitation, and providing inalienability of passengers’ rights) can be regarded as more efficient than American legal response to the same issue.
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