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Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: an evolutionary analysis

Antoci, Angelo and Russu, Paolo and Zarri, Luca (2014) Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: an evolutionary analysis. Economic modelling, Vol. 42 , p. 106-115. ISSN 0264-9993. eISSN 1873-6122. Article.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.002

Abstract

We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.

Item Type:Article
ID Code:10228
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords:Behavioral heterogeneity, cheating, eEvolutionary game theory, peer punishment, Public goods game, tax morale
Subjects:Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-S/06 Metodi matematici dell'economia e delle scienze attuariali e finanziarie
Divisions:001 Università di Sassari > 01-a Nuovi Dipartimenti dal 2012 > Scienze economiche e aziendali
Publisher:Elsevier Science
ISSN:0264-9993
eISSN:1873-6122
Deposited On:27 Oct 2014 11:52

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